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I.

INTRODUCTION

N RECENT YEARS, the franchise form of business has become
an increasingly important and efficient means of producing and
distributing products and services of uniform quality.' Although
franchising is a contractual alternative to vertical integration,2 the
franchisor-franchisee relationship presents inherent difficulties
which do not exist in vertically integrated firms.3 Specifically, the
franchisor's interest in assuring a consistent level of standardized
quality across franchise outlets is at odds with the franchisees'
interests in maximizing their own profits by "shirking" their responsibilities to provide a minimal level of acceptable product
1. See U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1984-86
Uan. 1986). Franchising sales of goods and services in 1986 are expected to be
576 billion or approximately 15.7% of gross national product (GNP). Id. at 1.
Product and trade-name franchises (such as auto and truck dealers, gasoline retailers and soft drink bottlers) account for $424.5 billion while business format
franchises (such as restaurants, nonfood retailing and personal and business
services) account for $151.3 billion. Id. at 2-3. The 10-year growth rate of sales
is 9.5% for product and trade-name franchises and 12.5% for business format
franchises. The projected two-year growth rates for the period 1984-86 are
7.1% and 11.2% respectively. Consequently, the growth rate of sales by business format franchises historically and currently outpaces that of product and
trade-name franchises.
2. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983). Vertical integration is the result of a firm's decision
to replace a market exchange of a good or service with an intra-firm transfer. Id.
at 11. For example, a firm replacing its open market sales of its final product to
distributors with ownership of its own distributors becomes vertically integrated.
There are many reasons firms decide to vertically integrate or exercise vertical
controls. The authors describe franchise agreements as complex market adaptations designed to alleviate the simultaneous opportunistic inclinations of
franchisors and franchisees. Id. at 26. One of the main reasons for franchising
agreements is the degree of control franchisors can exert over the production
and distribution of its products. In the franchise context, the relationship and
resultant business identity the participants create lies between one firm and
open market transactions. Rather than vertically integrate, the parties bilaterally
bargain and divide the benefits of their relationship. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess,
21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
3. See generally R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 2 (identifying difficulties
in contractual alternatives to vertical integration).
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quality. 4 As a result, franchisors have implemented various quality assurance mechanisms designed to minimize the problems
associated with recalcitrant franchisees. 5 Despite the procompetitive potential of these mechanisms, their legality is questionable.
This paper examines the law and economics of franchise
quality assurance mechanisms. 6 The first section describes the
nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, focusing on the
parties' sometimes dissimilar economic motivations. 7 Because
these motivations depend to a great extent upon the method a
franchisor uses to collect revenues from franchisees, the economic and behavioral impacts of the most common methods of
revenue collection are discussed. 8 Next, because franchisors and
franchisees share the intangible asset of franchise goodwill, this
first section will address the free riding problems which result.
These problems arise when a franchisee attempts to advance its
own economic interests through surreptitious reductions in its
costs of providing the standardized product. The franchisee does
benefit from the product demand which the franchise system generates; however, the franchisee's failure to maintain minimal quality levels concurrently erodes the system's overall goodwill.9 The
section concludes with an analysis of relational contract law in the
franchise context. The interactive, ongoing nature of franchise
agreements distinguishes them from other forms of business operations and has practical considerations for product quality control agreements.l 0
4. See infra notes 18-46 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text.
6. The term "mechanism" is used rather than the term "agreement" because franchisees would probably consider most product quality mechanisms to
be "disagreeable." The franchisee would characterize the product quality clause
in the franchise contract as objectionable, but necessary to acquire a franchise.
However, such mechanisms are "agreements" in the traditional sense because
franchisees voluntarily enter such contracts. In fact, in the absence of a
franchisor, franchisees would have to create some agent or protective association to police product quality. Consequently, franchisees ultimately have to
come to some agreement with the franchisor to deter product quality erosion.
See Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AMER.
ECON. REV. 519, 529-30 (Sept. 1983). So, at the outset it should be clear that
perceptive franchisors who recognize the need for product quality assurance in
advance and provide for it in franchise contracts, are not "imposing objectionable ex ante terms on unwilling franchisees. They are merely taking steps to realize the full value of the franchise." Id. at 530.
7. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 18-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
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The second section presents the most common quality assurance mechanisms." These include direct product provision,' 2
contractual specification,' 3 bonding agreements1 4 and tying arrangements.1 5 The third section discusses and evaluates each
mechanism according to contemporary legal standards.' 6 The
fourth section analyzes the economic effects of these mechanisms
focusing primarily on their potential for reducing policing,
agency and transactions costs. 1 7 Many of these mechanisms are
legally suspect despite economic justifications for their use in assuring product quality. Finally, this paper recommends that when
courts and policymakers evaluate the legality of these mechanisms, they consider the overall franchise agreement, including
the economic benefits of these quality assurance mechanisms.
II.

A.

FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RELATIONSHIPS

Franchise Contracts and Divergent Goals

Franchisors typically generate revenue from a combination of
fixed lump-sum fees and percentage royalties on franchisees'
11. See infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-123 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 124-94 and accompanying text. A brief description of
policing, agency and transactions costs is necessary at this stage. For purposes
of this paper, policing costs consist of the time, money and effort that the
franchisor expends to monitor franchisee product quality. These costs are the
result of joint sharing of the intangible goodwill asset. Transactions costs are
costs of negotiating, drafting and enforcing contracts between parties. These
costs occur in all contractual relations and are borne by both parties.
Agency costs are expenditures resulting from the principal-agent relationship, including monitoring expenditures by the principal, bonding expenditures
by the agent and residual loss. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
These monitoring expenditures differ from policing costs because they result
from the divergent goals of the principal and agent. The principal can limit this
divergence by establishing incentives for the agent and monitoring the agent's
potentially aberrant activity. Id.
Bonding expenditures are costs the agent incurs to guarantee that it will not
take action harmful to the principal or to ensure that the principal is compensated upon such action. Id. Examples are penalty clauses, firm-specific capital
investments and franchise fees. For a further economic discussion of bonding
agreements, see infra notes 143-73 and accompanying text.
Because it is generally impossible for any contractual arrangement to
costlessly ensure that an agent will always act in the principal's best interest,
there necessarily will be some divergence between the agent's action and the
action that would maximize the welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent
of this loss in welfare is the residual loss. Jensen & Meckling, supra at 308.
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sales.' 8 In addition, most franchise contracts require franchisees
to contribute a particular percentage of sales for advertising expenses. Under such agreements a franchisor's primary objective
is maximizing the level of sales generated by franchisees. A franchisee's objective, however, is to maximize its own profits. This
objective does not necessarily correlate with sales revenue maximization. In fact, economic theory suggests otherwise.
The economic explanation of franchisee behavior is based on
the unique nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 19
Most franchise contracts exist as substitutes for vertical integration. Franchisors generally cannot bear the financial burden of
creating their own distribution systems but wish to maintain the
greatest degree of control possible over their product's preparation and distribution. Consequently, a franchisor typically will
engage franchisees to perform services on the franchisor's behalf.
This strategy, however, involves delegating at least some decision-making authority to the franchisees. 2 0 Because the franchisees have their own incentives and goals divergent from those of
18. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 170-7 1; Blair & Kaserman,
Optimal Franchising,49 S. ECON. J. 494 (1982); see also Mathewson & Winter, The
Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 503, 503 (1985). The authors of
the latter article state:
In contrast to conventional market exchange, franchise contracts typically impose on franchisees retail quality standards, common hours of
business, price controls, and nonlinear payment schedules (for example, fixed initial royalty fees plus a percentage of gross retail revenues),
while franchisors typically provide national advertising and training
programs, monitor and inspect the franchisees' performance (with varying intensity across industries), and hold the residual power to terminate the franchise agreement.
Id.
19. The franchisor-franchisee relationship resembles the principal-agent
relationship in many ways. Though the legal conception of the principal-agent
relationship is more limited than the economic conception, there is a considerable amount of analytical overlap. Both legal and economic conceptions of
agency involve the agent choosing alternative actions with the principal specifying the parameters of the agent's discretion and the payoffs for the agent's performance. See Arrow, The Economics of Agency, Tech. Report No. 451, INSTITUTE
FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, STANFORD

UNIV.

(Oct.

1984). Although the franchisee may not technically be the principal's legal
agent, the franchisor legally controls much of the franchisee's discretionary authority. Consequently, the economic principal-agent model provides a valuable
descriptive model for analyzing the franchisee's behavior. See Rubin, The Theory
of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 225
(1978) ("definition of franchisee as a separate firm, rather than as part of
franchisor, is a legal and not an economic distinction").
20. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17, at 308. Many franchisors use psychological tests in their selection of new franchisees to identify applicants with
strong entrepreneurial qualities such as creativity and independence. These applicants ironically are less likely to receive franchises because they generally tend
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the franchisor, there is reason to expect that the franchisees will
not always act in the franchisor's best interests. 2 ' For example,
because of sales revenue royalties, a franchisee receives only a
portion of the sales revenue it generates while fully bearing the
costs of producing that revenue. At some point, the franchisee's
incremental production costs exceed its incremental net revenues, and it becomes economically more efficient for the franchisee to stop producing. 2 2 The franchisor, however, would
prefer the franchisee to continue expanding output because th e
franchisor receives a percentage of the revenues without incur23
ring costs.
This pursuit of sales revenue maximization results in an output level greater than that of the profit maximizing firm. The reasoning underlying this statement is straightforward: sales
revenue maximization myopically neglects the production and
operating costs of expanding output.2 4 Increases in output without regard to these additional costs results in a movement away
towards changing the franchise system and doing things their own way. Testing
Psyches of Future Franchisees, Wall St. J., May 20, 1988 at 27, col. 1.
21. Testing Psyches of Future Franchisees, supra note 20. This problem
manifests itself in many other contexts and is the central dilemma encountered
in any delegation of authority. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 15-21
(1969). One of that author's major theses is that the degree of discretion given
to governmental agencies is too great. He posits that rules should govern and
guide the exercise of unbridled discretion but "[tihe problem is not merely to
choose between rule and discretion but is to find the optimum point on the ruleto-discretion scale." Id. at 15. In the context of the private sector, a similar
problem exists. This tradeoff between steadfast rules and discretion is evident
in the formation of franchise agreements particularly in penalty and termination
clauses. See infra notes 85-98, 112-23 and accompanying text.
22. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, MICROECONOMIcs FOR MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING 414 (1983).
23. Id.
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24.

TC

$,

ITR

Q2 Qi
Where TC
TR
P

Q

Qo

Total cost of production
Total revenue function
Profit Function
Quantity of good X

Under typical assumptions, this graph is representative of most firms' production and cost functions. The total revenue function is increasing but at some
point reaches a maximum. It is at this point, output Q, where sales revenues
are maximized. Profits, however, are maximized at the output level Q, where
the difference between total revenue and total cost is the greatest.
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from the firm's profit maximizing output. 25 The additional output above the point of profit maximization reduces total profits
because the marginal costs of production exceed marginal revenue. A franchisor encouraging sales-revenue maximization implicitly requires franchisees to forego at least some of their profits
by increasing their sales above the point of cost-efficient production. 26 It is, therefore, not surprising that franchisors and franchisees favor different managerial goals. The next section
explains how these motivational differences are exacerbated by
the joint sharing of the intangible asset of franchise goodwill.

MC

MR,
Q2 Qi
Where MR
MR,
MC

= Marginal revenue
= Marginal revenue to franchisee = MR * (I -r)
= Marginal production costs

The graph above depicts the marginal revenue and marginal cost functions
derived from the revenue and cost functions. In the situation where a franchisor
collects a royalty on sales revenues, the franchisee's total revenue function will
be TRI = TR * (1 - r) where r = royalty rate. As a consequence, the franchisee's profit maximizing output is even further reduced. Instead of producing
at output Q1, the franchisee will produce at the point where marginal revenue
(MR 2) equals marginal cost at output equal to Q .
25. The profit maximizing output is Q1, which is less than the revenue maximizing output Qo.
26. The franchisee foregoes profits equal to (I1 0 - 1122). In return the
franchisor receives (R0 - Ri)*r where r = percentage royalty on sales.
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B.

Intangible Assets and the Free Rider Problem

The success of both business-format and product franchises
depends upon the development and maintenance of consumer
demand and goodwill for the franchised product or service.2 7 To
a great degree, the franchisor-franchisee relationship is based on
the benefits flowing from the mutual sharing of this joint resource. 28 Maintenance of this shared asset is accomplished by
generating demand for the product through marketing and product quality systems. In either type of franchise, the franchisor
generally provides national or regional marketing and advertising
assistance to the franchisees in return for a royalty of franchisee
sales. Though the local franchisees may be willing and authorized to provide local advertising and marketing, a franchisor primarily develops the franchise's reputation through this national
or regional advertising.2 9 This reputational asset is jointly shared
by the franchisor and all franchisees and is oftentimes based upon
a standardized franchise format or formula that consumers recognize as representing a particular type and quality of product or
service.
Because franchisors cannot precisely control which franchisees receive the benefits flowing from the creation of national or
regional goodwill, franchisees have an incentive to accept the
benefits of goodwill without contributing to the costs of maintaining product quality. In essence, the franchisees receive a "public
good."' 30 A national or regional marketing program creates an
intangible asset, goodwill, from which each franchisee cannot be
27. Mathewson & Winter, supra note 18, at 504-05.
28. Caves & Murphy, Franchising. Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 W.
ECON.J. 572 (1976).
29. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, supra note 22, at 361-62. In general, business
format franchising occurs when the minimum-cost output in advertising exceeds
the minimum-cost output in production. Thus, the organizational structure of a
franchise includes one firm (the franchisor) exploiting advertising economies of
scale while several others (the franchisees) produce the product locally. Id. at
362.
30. A public good, often termed a demand externality, is one which has two
properties: (1) nonexcludability and (2) nonrivalry in consumption. A nonexcludable good is one which it is impossible (or extremely costly) to prevent consumers or producers from consuming or using in the production of a given unit
of the commodity. National advertising and marketing programs are examples
of nonexcludable goods. It is impossible or exceedingly costly to prevent a local
franchisee from the benefits of such a program. A nonrival good is one whose
consumption by one consumer or producer does not diminish the amount of the
good others may consume. For example, two or more franchisees can simultaneously benefit from "consuming" a single "unit" of national advertising. See R.
RUSSELL & M. WILKINSON, MICROECONOMICs 373-75 (1979).
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excluded. For example, a franchise advertisement on a nationally
broadcasted television network provides benefits which all franchisees share; only a local blackout of the advertisement would
3
significantly reduce the benefits a particular franchisee receives. '
The creation of this shared asset creates a "free-rider" problem. Each franchisee has an incentive to "free ride" on the demand the franchisor and other nonshirking franchisees create for
the franchised product. 3 2 - Free riding involves franchisees who
decrease operating costs by reducing the level of product or service quality below franchise standards. 33 These cheating franchisees "free ride" on the goodwill that the franchisor and
conforming franchisees create among consumers. 34 By free riding, the franchisee increases its own profits but potentially erodes
the shared goodwill asset. 35 However, the franchisee's actions are
somewhat shortsighted because it is the franchise system that ultimately is harmed: as part of the system, the franchisee is injured
31. The benefits a franchisee enjoys from national or regional advertising
are reduced to the extent the franchisee relies upon repeat business. For example, a fast-food franchise located along a busy interstate relies upon such advertising more than a franchise located near a moderately populated university
location. The interstate location dictates fewer repeat sales than the university
location.
32. See Klein & Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28J.L.
& EcoN. 345, 349 (1985). To a certain degree, this incentive exists independent
of the free-rider problem. In basic principal-agent situations, the agent has a
general incentive to "shirk" on obligations because the agent's motivations do
not precisely correspond to the principal's. The potential to free-ride on the
goodwill generated by nonshirking franchisees greatly increases this incentive.
33. Id. at 350-51; see also Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 J.Q. ECON. 488 (1970). If the quality of the product
is observable before purchase, the incentive to reduce quality is diminished.
Consequently, search goods and experience goods are dissimilar with respect to
the free-riding problem. For a discussion of search, experience and credence
goods, see infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
34. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 18, at 506. Two externalities result
when a franchisor creates a brand name through national advertising. The first,
termed a vertical externality, occurs when franchisees free ride on the national
brand name. The second, termed a horizontal externality, results when a franchisee free rides on the local quality of other franchisees. Id.; see, e.g., Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.
1977). In an antitrust action based upon an illegal supplier system, a court has
stated "[i]ndividual franchisees, after all, may increase profits by utilizing inferior supplies while continuing to attract customers because of the reputation established and maintained by other franchisees who conform to the quality
standards." Id. at 381 n.12.
35. See Williamson, supra note 6, at 529. "[S]ince the costs savings that result from local quality debasement accrue to the local operator while the adverse
demand effects are diffused throughout the system, suppliers now have an incentive to free ride off of the reputation of the system." Id.
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also. 36
As a result of the franchisee's incentive to diminish and conceal product quality, the franchisor will necessarily institute some
mechanisms to ensure franchisees maintain minimal levels of
product quality. These mechanisms are oftentimes legally suspect because they restrain the economic freedom of the franchisee. By their very nature, mechanisms assuring product
quality eliminate various decision-making options the franchisee
may otherwise desire. However, these contractually imposed
mechanisms are integral parts of the overall franchise agreement.
The maintenance of consumer goodwill is the raison d'tre for
quality control mechanisms. Franchises without strictly enforced
quality standards will suffer in the competitive marketplace. As
the next section explains, an understanding of the distinctive nature of franchise contracts is critical before one can properly assess the usefulness of product quality assurance mechanisms.
C. Relational Contract Theory and Franchising
Because franchise relationships are contractually based, it is
instructive to examine the idiosyncracies of franchise quality control arrangements relative to contract law theory. For example,
because many quality control mechanisms are based upon ongoing, interactive franchise relationships, they are dissimilar from
quality agreements in discrete sales contracts where parties
merely engage in autonomous exchange. This difference affects
the manner in which franchisors implement, and courts construe,
product quality agreements. Recognition of the distinctions between the various contractual arrangements has resulted in two
major descriptive theories of contractual relationships: classical
contracting and relational contracting.
Under classical contract theory, parties are presumed to completely specify all risks arising from their dealings. 3 7 This presupposes that the parties have complete information regarding the
material aspects of the subject matter of their contract. Upon the
36. Id. at 530.
37. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236-37 (1979). The classical theory of contract
law views contracts as discrete events rather than evolving relationships. In like
manner, classical theory focuses on "presentation" as the present realization
and specification of all future contingencies. Id. The economic phrase descriptive of the classical approach is "contingent-claims contracting," which involves
comprehensive agreements accounting for risks of all future events without regard to their probability of occurrence or distance in the future. Id. at 236.
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occurrence of a breach or other contingency, the parties turn to
their agreement to determine who bears the risk of the breach. If
their agreement is silent on the contingency, common law or stat8
utory principles fill the gaps.A
The conception of completely specified contracts does not
accord with the types of contracts used in highly interactive contractual arrangements.A9 Completely specified contracts are frequently not feasible due to the continuous and lengthy nature of
the contractual relationship which makes future contingencies uncertain or particularly difficult to specify. Consequently, parties
will seek other contractual arrangements, termed relational contracts, to satisfy their mutual goals.
Relational contracts are characterized by the parties' inabilities to reduce important terms of their agreement into well-defined obligations. 40 In the franchise context it is difficult for
parties to precisely specify certain obligations, such as the level of
effort a franchisee must exert in promoting sales. 4 1 Many
franchise quality assurance agreements fall into this relational
contract category. Rather than concrete standards, franchise contracts often have language such as "best efforts," "reasonable efforts," or "good faith" to describe the standard of performance
38. The role of legal regulation of contractual terms has an economic
foundation.
[C]ontract rules serve as standard or common risk allocations that can
be varied by the individual agreement of particular parties. These rules
serve the important purpose of saving most bargainers the cost of negotiating a tailor-made arrangement. If the basic risk allocation provided by a legal rule fails to suit the purposes of particular parties, then
bargainers are free to negotiate an alternative allocation of risks.
Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981).
39. See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963) (study indicating businessmen rely less on making agreements
understandable than upon forming complete contingent contracts); see also
Goetz & Scott, supra note 38, at 1090-91.
40. Goetz & Scott, supra note 38, at 1091. "Such definitive obligations may
be impractical because of [an] inability to identify uncertain future conditions or
because of [an] inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately even
when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance." Id.
41. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 18, at 503. The authors note "[a]s
an organizational arrangement, the franchise contract lies between anonymous
price-mediated exchange and centralized intrafirm employment." Id.; accord
Goetz & Scott, supra note 38, at 1100. The latter authors find that there is a
subset of relational contracts, termed sequential contingent contracts, that deal
with methods of handling the uncertainty and complexity of negotiations. Parties agree to a sequence of increasingly specific short-term contracts rather than
one long-term contract. Id. A series of short-term contracts, in some contexts,
better allocates risks by allowing parties to recontract in future periods based
upon increased experience and information. Id.
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expected. 4 2 This lack of precision in the franchise agreement creates a potential for litigation when the parties differ over contrac43
tual obligations.
Relational agreements necessarily inject the element of materiality into any dispute over parties' respective obligations under
the agreement. 44 Under complete contingent contracting, a
franchisor specifies definitive formulae and standards for the production of the franchised good or service. Termination and damage clauses specify the precise procedures and sanctions
franchisees could incur based upon the particular deviations from
the standards the franchisors might detect. The fundamental assumption underlying this type of contractual relationship is that
the parties are perfectly informed of contractual obligations and
penalties for the breach of such duties. Consequently, the materiality of the breach does not matter; if a breach occurs, there is a
specified remedy the parties must follow. However, relational
contract standards are more indefinite. They require parties to
interact to a greater degree in those situations where the standard
of conduct is vague by nature and the materiality of the breach
questionable. Thus, product quality clauses may be difficult to
draft with enough specificity for a court to fully understand and
enforce. 45 Consequently, the distinctions between the classical
contract and relational contract theories have practical implica46
tions as applied to franchise quality agreements.
42. For an economic definition of "good faith," see Goetz & Scott, supra
note 38, at 1139. "Good faith is best conceived as a rule for policing cheating
on the terms of the contract or other opportunistic behavior designed to redistribute risks already allocated by the agreement." Id.
43. See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). Bloor, a trustee in bankruptcy for
Ballantine Beer, sued Falstaff alleging breach of contract. Falstaff had
purchased the Ballantine brand for four million dollars plus a 50-cent royalty
per barrel. 454 F. Supp. at 260. Falstaff also agreed to "use its best efforts to
promote and maintain a high volume of sales." Id. The court found that Falstaff
had failed to act as an "average, prudent, comparable brewer" would have acted
given Falstaff's capabilities. Id. at 272. One motivating factor for Falstaff's failure to adequately promote the Ballantine brand was the fact that, although the
two brands were identical, Falstaff produced more profit because it was a "premium" beer. However, the court held that Falstaff's marketing policies, though
treating both brands equally, were improper because Falstaff's duties regarding
its own beer were to its shareholders while its duties in promoting Ballantine
were contractually to the plaintiff. Id. at 276-77.
44. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 38, at 1139.
45. See Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV.
521, 575 (1981). The author suggests that terminable-at-will clauses provide an
attractive alternative to extensive quality assurance agreements. Id. at 575-80.
46. As these agreements become less well-defined, a court or arbiter will
emphasize the materiality factor more heavily. For a discussion of judicially im-
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This brief description of the franchisor-franchisee relationship sets forth the analytical underpinnings necessary to evaluate
the usefulness of various quality assurance mechanisms. Because
of the incongruity between franchisee and franchisor goals, the
chosen method for maintaining product quality is critical to the
long term health of a franchise system. A mechanism that compels minimum quality standards increases the competitive
strength of an entire franchise network. Independent of other
contractual requirements, particular quality control mechanisms
may appear harsh and occasionally inequitable. However, given
the discordant objectives that drive franchisees to spurn their duties to maintain product quality, franchisors need an adaptable
and effective collection of quality control devices. The next section examines and describes the primary methods of assuring
product quality.
III.

QUALITY ASSURANCE MECHANISMS

A.

Direct Sale of Product

The most obvious method of assuring product quality is the
direct sale by the franchisor of final products to the franchisee.
This method assures the franchisor that the franchisee sells a
product conforming to the given quality level. 4 7 This arrange-

ment also allows the franchisor to directly monitor the franchisee's sales. For example, a shoe franchisor directly selling its
products to its franchisees ensures that the franchisees are not
substituting an inferior product; in addition, the franchisor can
account for any discrepancies between reported and actual fran48
chisee sales.
Often, a franchise cannot economically provide franchisees
with finished products for distribution. In some industries, the
posed remedies in termination cases, see infra note 114. See, e.g., Lippo v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1985) (franchisee's misbranding of gasoline
within class of offenses under franchise contract's 10 day cure provision), aff'd,
802 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1374 (1987).
47. See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). The court in Susser accepted the franchisor's product quality defense to a charge of tying of ice cream purchases to the trademark
license. The decision was based on the difficulty of contractually specifying "the
desired texture and taste of an ice cream cone or sundae." 332 F.2d at 520.
48. Franchisors who collect royalties on gross sales benefit from this type of
monitoring because the actual sales information is useful in verifying reported
sales. Variations of actual from reported sales would possibly signal franchisee
noncompliance with the franchise agreement. In addition, the information is
useful in other areas such as inventory and sales projections as well as others.
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economies of scale in producing the franchised product are much
greater in marketing than in production. 4 9 Many times the economies of scale in production are such that local production of the
franchise product is more cost-efficient than national production. 50 As a consequence, franchises may turn to other contractual methods of assuring product quality.
B.

ContractualSpecification

One widely used method of product quality assurance is contractual specification. Franchisees, or intermediate producers,
construct the final product in accordance with the franchisor's
specifications. These specifications may take several forms and
may provide for varying levels of franchisee effort and discretion.
In addition, the franchisor may require that certain inputs be
purchased from the franchisor 5 or from other designated
52
sources.
This manner of product quality assurance affords the franchisee a degree of discretion unavailable under direct provision.
Because the franchisee exercises some control over the production of the final commodity, there exists the possibility that a franchisee will violate the franchisor's contractual formulation. The
typical example would be a franchisee's substitution of a cheaper
input in the production process in order to decrease production
costs.

53

Although a franchisee is able under this arrangement to

abuse its discretion, such abuse may result in a franchisor's suing
54
the franchisee for breach of contract.
A contractually specified franchise formula will necessarily
49. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, supra note 22, at 360-62.
50. Id. The authors state "[tihe profitability of a franchise will depend on
the scale economies in advertising and in production. Products where the minimum-cost levels of production are low (e.g., locally produced products) are
likely candidates for franchises." Id. at 362.
51. For a discussion of tying arrangements, see infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of supplier systems, see infra text accompanying notes
57-58.
53. The franchisee may reduce costs in other ways as well. For example, it
can cut maintenance costs by providing substandard sanitation and health related services. See, e.g., Bonanza Int'l, Inc. v. Restaurant Management Consultants, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1431 (E.D. La. 1986) (failure to comply with sanitation
and cleanliness standard, inter alia, justified automatic termination). Additional
examples include avoiding expenditures on new products and reducing product
promotion expenses. Even the failure to maintain adequate lighting in and
around a franchise facility reduces the franchisee's production costs.
54. For a discussion of termination clauses, see infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
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require occasional franchisor monitoring of franchisees' operations and production processes. Consumers of the franchise
product implicitly rely upon the franchisor to police and control
product quality. Inattentive franchisors will face marketplace
sanctions if they inadequately perform their quality control responsibilities. The demand for their products will fall as consumers consistently encounter shirking franchisees.
The franchisor's primary monitoring method is direct inspection of franchisees' production procedures and final product
quality. The franchisor develops and institutes a methodology for
monitoring and detecting violations of the contractually imposed
quality standards. The sanctions for violations may be monetary,
reputational, or terminative. This system of policing product
quality imposes costs upon the franchisor. 55 However, the
franchisor expects to benefit directly from the investment in policing costs. First, the system preserves the value of the
franchise's goodwill by meeting consumer product quality expectations. Thus, the franchisor benefits by avoiding a decline in
product demand due to consumer dissatisfaction. Second, the
threat of sanctions directly affects franchisee behavior. Franchisees must consider the possibility of sanctions, and resulting reduction in profits, for detected breaches of the franchise
agreement. Consequently, franchisees will devote greater effort
to avoid sanctions either by avoiding detection or by complying
56
with quality standards.
Another device franchisors use to assure product quality
through contractual specification is the creation of a system of approved suppliers. Franchisors may require that certain inputs be
of particular grades or qualities or supplied by particular suppliers. Instead of directly monitoring every franchisee to ensure
compliance with product input quality standards, the franchise
agreement may require franchisees to provide documentation of
its purchases to the franchisor. In this manner, franchisee compliance with. product standards is efficiently achieved.
This method of quality assurance is not without pitfalls, how55. Policing costs include: (1) direct inspection costs (including salaries
and travel); (2) product testing costs; and (3) administrative costs.
56. Franchisees may simply invest in methods of avoiding detection. For
example, if a franchisee can determine when an inspection will occur, it can
avoid detection of substandard quality by complying with standards for the inspection period. Also, it may be cost-efficient for a franchisee to continue violating the quality standards absent sanctions sufficient to ensure compliance. For
an economic analysis of bonding and tying arrangements as means to prevent
these practices, see infra notes 143-85 and accompanying text.
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ever. While the free rider problem is reduced to a great extent at
the franchisee level, a sub-free rider problem develops among the
specified suppliers. Because suppliers know their approved product has a captive market of franchisees, each will find it profitable
5 7 Of
to free ride on the goodwill of other complying suppliers.
course, the franchisor's monitoring problem may not be as great
because there may be fewer suppliers than franchisees to monitor. 58 Nevertheless, because franchisors generally find it necessary to monitor final product provision, a supplier system may
simply provide an additional monitoring problem. Despite these
drawbacks, for franchisors requiring a particular input to be of
special quality, supplier systems provide a means of at least partially reducing monitoring costs and ultimately ensuring product
quality.
C.

Bonding Agreements

Indirect incentive systems are a way of assuring product quality when monitoring costs are substantial. 59 For instance,
franchisors may require franchisees to enter into bonding agreements. 60 These agreements are designed to discourage franchisees from taking action which would harm the franchisor or, in the
alternative, to ensure that the franchisor will be compensated if
the franchisee does take such action. 6' Bonding agreements essentially require the franchisees to expend or pledge resources as
a guarantee that they will perform in conformity with the
franchisor's desires. 62 These types of agreements are generally
57. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977). The court recognized that "[m]anufacturers and
franchisees alike may profit by ignoring [the franchisor's] product specifications." Id. at 381 n.12. The franchisor may then find it necessary not only to
announce product specifications but also to police observance of those standards. Id.
58. Id. The court noted that "controlling quality at the franchisee level may
be impractical for [Kentucky Fried] with 3800 outlets.... It may thus be reasonable ... for Kentucky Fried to controlquality at the manufacturer level." Id.
59. Goetz & Scott, supra note 38, at 1093.
60. Id. at 1130-34.
61. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17, at 308.
62. A bonding agreement is also a form of warranty. When the franchisor
has difficulty monitoring and detecting the quality of franchisee products, the
franchisor may require a franchisee to guarantee that product quality will meet
certain standards. Conceptually, the franchisee is providing a warranty of product quality by pledging assets in case of a breach. See generally Grossman, The
Informational Role of Warranties and Private DisclosureAbout Product Quality, 24 J.L. &
EcON. 461 (1981) (warranties facilitate allocation of resources by signalling
higher product quality).
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self-enforcing because the franchisee continues in the relationship until it believes that it would profit by terminating the
relationship.63

There are a number of ways a franchisor can bind the franchisee into compliance with the franchise agreement. First, penalty clauses providing for fines in excess of direct damages deter
franchisee violations. 64 Second, the reduction in value of firmspecific capital assets upon termination imposes a loss on shirking
franchisees. 6 5 Third, franchisee forfeiture of high initial capital
contributions for breaches of franchise quality control agreements encourage at least initial compliance with franchise standards. 66 In each of these situations, the franchisor is
contractually requiring his franchisees to credibly commit some
current or future asset as a "hostage" in case a breach should
occur.

67

D.

Tying

Tying is an intermediate method of ensuring product quality.
Tying involves a contractually imposed duty on franchisees to
purchase particular items exclusively from the franchisor and to
use them in the local production of the final product. A
franchisor may desire this arrangement for a number of reasons.
63. See Telser, A Theory of Self-EnforcingAgreements, 53J. Bus. 27 (1980). The
author describes self-enforcing agreements:
No one would enter an agreement expecting the other parties to violate
it. In a self-enforcing agreement the only penalty that can be imposed
on the violator is stopping the agreement. Therefore, aware of this, a
potential violator compares the current gain from a violation with the
sacrifice of future gains that will result in response to his current violation. These future gains would accrue to him were he to remain faithful
to the agreement. He chooses the more profitable alternative. It follows that the parties to a self-enforcing agreement do not expect any
violations of it. The terms of the agreement are such that adherence is
more advantageous than violation.
Id. at 43-44.
64. For a legal analysis of penalty clauses, see infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text. For an economic analysis of penalty clauses, see infra notes 145-68
and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 169-73.
66. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. Another similar form of
bonding is a covenant not to compete. Upon termination, such a covenant prevents the franchisee from operating a similar business in competition with the
franchisor, the economic effect of which is to impose a potentially costly constraint on the franchisee post-termination. Viewed ex ante, however, the covenant acts as the franchisee's pledge or guarantee of performance in conformity
with the franchise agreement.
67. See Williamson, supra note 6, at 519; see also Telser, supra note 63, at 43.
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First, franchisors may use tying as a protection against disclosure of trade secrets. Franchisee production of an input protected as a trade secret necessarily increases the chances of both
disclosure and loss of legal protection. Consequently, tying provides a legitimate means of protecting a formula or process from
inadvertent disclosure. Second, a particular secret formula or ingredient may be subject to intolerable irregularities in local franchisee production. In such a case, direct provision of the input
reduces uncertainty in product quality by ensuring that critical inputs meet minimum standards. Thus, tying is prominent in those
franchises where a franchisee's local production of either particular inputs or the final product is subject to unacceptable
variations.
Third, because tying arrangements afford franchisors a degree of certainty over the quality of inputs used in the franchisee's
production process, the level of'policing costs may decline. 68
With a tying arrangement, the production process no longer requires the same level of franchisor monitoring to ensure consistency. However, the magnitude of the reduction of policing costs
depends upon the extent to which franchisor monitoring is still
required after the tie. For example, a franchisee might still cheat
despite the purchase of particular tied inputs, because a tying arrangement, a priori, will not affect a franchisee's incentive to
cheat. The franchisee can resell the tied goods and purchase
cheaper inputs. Incidentally, this method of cheating is limited by
69
the transactions costs of such a scheme.
Finally, tying arrangements provide franchisors with a means
of metering franchisee sales and revenue collection. This method
of measuring franchisee sales not only provides a secondary assurance that franchisees are properly reporting sales, but also acts
as a means of extracting rents either in proportion to a franchisee's sales 70 or from specific profitable products. 7' This ex68. See Klein & Saft, supra note 32, at 351-54. For a discussion of the reduction of policing costs through the use of penalty clauses, see infra notes 132-42
and accompanying text.
69. For example, the negotiating and enforcement costs of secondary trading agreements may outweigh the benefits of substituting an inferior input.
70. See, e.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936); see also Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957). Bowman, in analyzing the Button-Fastener case, Heaton Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 65 F. 619 (C.C.W.D. Mich.
1895), rev'd, 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896), found that Button-Fastener's requirement
that users of its patented button-stapling machine buy staples from Button-Fastener at a price slightly above the market price for use with the machine, allowed
Button-Fastener to collect the equivalent of a small royalty on the rental of the
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traction, while subject to challenges of unfairness, 72 can be
justified by the benefits a franchisee receives from the franchise
goodwill. Because most franchise agreements require franchisees
to pay a particular percentage of total sales for advertising and
marketing, tying arrangements act as alternative methods of revenue collection. 7 3 In competitively structured markets, these types
of tying arrangements are particularly benign given their poten74
tial for assuring product quality at minimal cost.
Franchisees may also desire and benefit from tying arrangements. Under a tying arrangement, the franchisor bears the risks
of market price fluctuations and input availability, thereby lessening a franchisee's uncertainty over the price and quantity of particular inputs. 7 5 Eliminating these risks allows the franchisee to
make production and marketing decisions without concern for adverse changes in market conditions. 76 Consequently, franchisees
tend to produce a greater level of output, which ultimately bene77
fits both the overall franchise and the consumers.
machine. As a result of the pricing arrangement, more machines were rented
because of their lower rental rates. Button-Fastener then collected a return
from the machines in proportion to the amount of use. So, Button-Fastener
collected more from those who used the machines more heavily. Bowman, supra
at 23-24. Some commentators have characterized this method of extracting revenues as price discrimination; however, it is more analogous to a metering
method which enables the collection of revenue in proportion to usage. Id. at
24. For a further discussion, see infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd in part, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
see also Klein & Saft, supra note 32, at 345. The authors suggest that the Chicken
Delight franchisors monitored purchase of paper products "not because of quality control considerations but because it collected the franchise fee as a profit on
these items (in lieu of a percentage of gross sales charge)." Id. at 348.
72. For a discussion of the fairness argument, which is based upon the
transfer of wealth from one party to another, see infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
73. See generally R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 48-82. However,
at least one court has held that this is a legally insufficient justification for a tying
arrangement. See, e.g., Siegel, 311 F. Supp. 847.
74. For a further analysis of the economic justifications for tying, see infra
notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
75. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 83-109. The benefits attributable to tying are greatest when the franchisee is more risk adverse than the
franchisor. Id. at 106.
76. With the tie-in, the franchisee is relatively certain about the cost of the
input bundle. Therefore, its demand for the bundle increases. Essentially, the
reduced risk of input price fluctuations results in franchisees demanding more of
the tied bundle. Id. at 106-07.
77. Id. at 103-09. The tying arrangement is a contractual alternative to vertical integration. The franchisor could vertically integrate forward to dispel the
effects of random input prices; a tie-in sale, however, would result in the same
fall in the market price and the expansion of output of the final good. Id. at 107-
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Tying arrangements are not without criticisms. Historically,
78
legislative and judicial responses to them have been hostile.
Conventional antitrust jurisprudence condemns tying due to fears
that monopolists will extend their monopoly power into other
markets, 79 that consumers will purchase products they do not
want, 80 and that tying will foreclose competition in the tied
good. 8 1 Despite tying's alleged potential for anticompetitive effects, the current trend is to consider more closely the economic
82
justifications for tying in particular situations.
The next sections provide the legal and economic analyses of
the various quality control mechanisms described above. 83 The
legal analysis states the current standards courts apply when determining the legality of these mechanisms. That section also describes the possible abusive uses of each mechanism. The
economic analysis presents the procompetitive justifications for
the use of alternative mechanisms. That section focuses on the
efficiency-enhancing benefits of these mechanisms and their po84
tential for minimizing policing, agency and transactions costs.
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF QUALITY CONTROL MECHANISMS

Currently, many of the mechanisms franchises might chose
for assuring product quality are illegal. Penalty clauses, tying arrangements and termination provisions all have been subject to
judicial or legislative antipathy in many jurisdictions. A brief
overview of these methods, and the legal and policy rationales for
their disfavor, follows.
08. Additionally, the franchisor's profits would increase, causing a net increase
in social welfare. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
80. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 445 (1977) (tying
reduces the choices open to purchasers of tied product); Blair & Finci, The Individual Coercion Doctrine and Tying Arrangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST.

U.L. REV. 531 (1983) (individual coercion doctrine, which often arises in
franchise situations, serves no purpose other than to unjustly enrich
franchisees).

81. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 394-404 (1985).
82. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.

83. Other various legal methods of assuring product quality, such as contractual specifications or termination with due process, are not considered in
this analysis.
84. For a discussion of policing, agency and transactions costs, see supra
notes 132-42.
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Penalty Clauses

Contractual provisions fixing a definite sum to be paid in the
event of a breach are enforceable if such provisions are construed
as valid liquidated damages clauses and not as efforts to penalize
the breaching party. 8 5 If a court determines that a clause operates as a penalty, the clause is unenforceable and only actual damages are recoverable. 8 6 Consequently, it is important to identify
factors courts use to distinguish liquidated damages from
penalties.
Courts follow certain guidelines in determining whether provisions are reasonable estimates of compensatory damages or punitive in nature. Courts first determine if the parties, in good
faith, intended the damage clause to be an estimate of the actual
damages which would result from a particular breach. 8 7 Factors
courts consider include the language of the contract, 8 8 the difficulty or uncertainty of estimating damages at the time the parties
entered the contract 89 and the reasonableness of the estimate.9 0
If a court finds, based on these factors, that the clause was intended to estimate actual damage, the contractual provision is enforceable as a valid liquidated damages clause. A contrary
holding results in the provision being void as a penalty clause. In
addition to this mutually exclusive approach to classifying such
provisions, courts have fashioned tests for punitive damages. 9 1 A
damage clause is punitive in nature if it is intended as a threat to
85. See 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE

ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 783 (3d

ed. 1961 & Supp. 1987). Courts consider the parties' intent at the time of contracting in determining whether a clause is punitive in nature. See Stenor, Inc. v.
Lester, 58 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1951). This determination is generally based on
objective principles such as whether the stated damages are proportionate to
actual damages. See, e.g., Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 398-99 (Fla. 1954) (en
banc).
86. See, e.g., Williams v. Crouch, 186 So. 2d 491, 492-93 (Fla. 1966). The
measure of actual damages recoverable may exceed the amount of the liquidated
damages. See Hutchinson v. Tompkins, 240 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970), cert. granted and district court ruling quashed, 259 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1972).
87. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 85, § 778.
88. Id. §§ 776, 778. For example, the fact that parties call a stipulated sum
"liquidated damages" or a "penalty" is not conclusive. See, e.g., Hyman, 73 So.
2d at 398. However, courts will give such terms effect when they appear to be
reasonable. See, e.g., Stenor, 58 So. 2d at 675-76.
89. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 85, § 783; see, e.g., Bill Heard Leasing, Inc. v.
Rocco Enters., Inc., 334 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1976).
90. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 85, § 779; see, e.g., Hungerford Constr. Co. v.
Florida Citrus Exposition, Inc., 410 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 928 (1969).
91. Analytically, a clause may not satisfy the liquidated damages test but
still not be a penalty clause. A finding that a particular clause fails to satisfy the
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prevent a breach, 92 or as a kind of security or guarantee insuring
93
the other party's performance.
Another factor courts consider is the "unjust enrichment"
that may result from penalty clauses. The inequitable nature of
penalties can arise in two ways: (1) such clauses may encourage
franchisors to make fraudulent claims against franchisees simply
to collect penalty payments;9 4 and (2) penalties sometimes provide a "windfall" to franchisors even where franchisees do
breach. The first situation is a clear case of unjust and unlawful
enrichment, and remedies exist to prevent such opportunistic behavior. The second situation myopically focuses on the benefit to
the franchisor rather than the reproachfulness of the franchisee's
conduct or the deterrent effect of a penalty. The concept of unjust enrichment implies a relative balancing of the circumstances
and moral context surrounding a breach.9 5 Judicial disfavor with
"unjust enrichment" must be consistent with the other underlying policies of the law.9 6 In sum, a court will invalidate a penalty
clause if it finds that the primary purpose of the clause is to enliquidated damages test does not necessarily imply that the clause is punitive
because of the possibility that it might fall between the two tests.
92. The common-law rationale of such provisions is their tendency to
frighten or terrorize a beneficiary or lessee into performing or not performing
certain acts, such as not contesting a will or lease. Courts have held these in
terrorem clauses to be against public policy and have viewed them as mere attempts to improperly influence the behavior of affected parties. See 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 85, § 776.
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp.,
100 N.J. 166, 184-85, 495 A.2d 66, 75 (1985). A doughnut franchisor sought to
terminate its contract with a doughnut franchisee who had been grossly underreporting gross revenues. In upholding the forfeiture of the franchisee's two locations, valued collectively at $250,000, the court stated:
[Iun applying the concept of 'unjust enrichment' we are mindful of the
'moral aura' surrounding the phrase and must take care not to elevate
the principle to a higher level than it deserves. '[T]he task is to make
the unjust enrichment principle work with, not instead of, the other
policies of the law ... '
Even where a person has received a benefit from another, he is
liable to pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to
retain it.
Here the franchisee deserves to have the full weight of the legal
remedies fall upon him.
Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). The court recognized that the franchisee's
misconduct not only damaged the franchisor but all other franchisees as well.
Id. at 185, 495 A.2d at 75.
96. Id.
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sure contractual performance. 9 7 The economic justifications for
using such clauses will be addressed later in this paper. 98

B.

Tying

Tying arrangements are illegal under section 3 of the Clayton
Act9 9 and section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 0 0 Judicial hostility towards tying arrangements is evident by their classification under
the per se standard of antitrust scrutiny.' 0 ' Proof of the existence
of an illegal tie requires three conditions: (1) the tied and tying
products are separate products; 0 2 (2) there is sufficient market
power in the tying good to enforce the tie;' 0 3 and (3) there is a
not insubstantial amount of commerce affected in the tied
97. The fundamental reasons courts disfavor the use of penalty clauses are
first, the notion that these clauses overcompensate the non-breaching party and
second, the fear that a penalty may prevent an economically efficient breach.
Goetz & Scott, LiquidatedDamages, Penaltiesand the Just CompensationPrinciple: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
554, 556 (1977).
98. See infra notes 145-68 and accompanying text.
99. Section 3 of the Clayton Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities,
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale.., or
fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such
price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the . . .commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
100. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal .. " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
101. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Justice
Frankfurter, in his oft-quoted polemic, stated "[tying] servets] hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." Id. at 305-06.
102. Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18-19 (1984). The test is
whether there is sufficient demand for the purchase of the tied good separate
from the tying good "to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient
to offer [the tied and tying goods] separately." Id. at 21-22. The single product
rule provides some exceptions to this element. For example, a franchisor tying
its trademark to its unique formula or product is simply marketing a distinctive
commodity. See New York v. Carvel Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 8147
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 26, 1984) (tie of trademark to ice cream mix); see also
Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
970 (1981) (tie of trademark, lease and security deposit a method of doing business and one product).
103. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14. The Court stated "we have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability-usually
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good. 10 4 The historical concern with tying is based upon "the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either
did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms."' 0 5
Some courts, recognizing that franchisors have a legitimate
interest in preserving the quality of products or services offered
by franchisees, have recognized a "product quality" defense to
tying. 10 6 Upon a showing of an illegal tie, the franchisor may justify its actions by proving that specifications for product substitutes would be so complex and detailed that such specifications
0 7
would be impracticable.'

The current trend, emerging in both the courts and
academia, is toward softening the per se rule against tying. The
United States Supreme Court's most recent tying decision, 0 8
though continuing with per se language, contains a four-member
concurrence urging the reclassification of tying under the rule of
reason. 10 9 The concurrence argued that because tying analysis
requires extensive economic inquiry before the per se label apcalled 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not
do in a competitive market." Id.
104. Id. at 16. The judicial rationale for this element lies in the fact that
"[i]f only a single purchaser were 'forced' with respect to the purchase of a tied
item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient to warrant the
concern of antitrust law." Id. So, there must be a substantial potential for impact on competition measured by the "not insubstantial" standard.
105. Id. at 12.
106. See, e.g., Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir.
1977) (requiring purchasers of cemetery lots to purchase markers and installation from lot seller unjustified under quality control rationale), rev'd, 682 F.2d
830 (9th Cir. 1982); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging
Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) (supplies and equipment from designated
source); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(franchisor's requirement of purchasing paper products held illegal), aff'd in
part, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971); cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Under per se
tying analysis, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the tie-in is the
least burdensome method for effectively controlling quality; in determining
whether the tie-in is an unreasonable restraint of trade, the rule of reason applies and quality control is one factor the trier of fact considers. Kentucky Fried,
549 F.2d at 381.
107. See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed,
381 U.S. 125 (1965). Courts rely upon the language in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States: "The only situation ... in which the protection of goodwill may
necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would
be so detailed that they could not practicably be supplied." 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1949).
108. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
109. The concurrence, authored by Justice O'Connor, was joined by Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 32.
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plies, it "incurs the cost of the rule-of-reason approach without
achieving its benefits.... "1 0 The concurrence further noted that
restrictions on a franchisee's freedom to purchase inputs is subject to greater scrutiny than restrictions on the franchisee's freedom of resale."II It appears probable that courts will soon
abandon the per se label on tying.
C.

Termination Clauses

Contractually based termination clauses outline, with varying
specificity, the allocation of burdens and risks in case of franchisee misfeasance or nonfeasance."t 2 These clauses have been
11 3
subject to judicial interpretations and legislative restrictions.
The legality of privately contracted termination provisions turns
on courts' interpretations of the sufficiency and reasonableness of
such terms. 1 4 For example, courts have upheld terminations for
110. Id. at 34. The Court noted: "[T]he [tying] doctrine calls for the extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic
analysis would show to be beneficial." Id.
111. Id. at 35 n.2. The concurrence contrasted this case with both Siegel v.
Chicken Delight Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, 448 F.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) and Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Siegel used a per se analysis in finding a
tying arrangement illegal despite the franchisor's defense of product quality and
goodwill maintenance, while Continental used a rule-of-reason analysis in the
context of vertical nonprice restraints. The concurrence found it anomalous
that some courts analyze tying under the per se doctrine while other courts analyze largely indistinguishable arrangements under the rule-of-reason. 466 U.S.
at 35 n.2.
112. This paper does not consider the situation where the franchise agreement is silent on termination. In such a case, courts determine whether the termination is reasonable based upon "the sufficiency of the notice of termination,
the reason for the termination, the ability of the franchisee to absorb the loss
associated with an unrecouped investment, the franchisee's ability to start the
business anew at another location, and the income derived by the franchisee
during the entire relationship in comparison to the resources invested." Laufer,
Wrongful Termination of a Franchise, 3 CAL. LAw. 21 (April 1983).
113. The termination of franchisees occurs for a number of reasons. For
example, of the 2,649 franchisor-initiated terminations in 1984, 1419 were for
nonpayment of royalties or other financial obligations, 270 were for franchisee
failure to comply with quality control standards and 960 were for other unspecified reasons. See U.S. DEPTr. OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, 198486 13 (Jan. 1986).
114. See, e.g., Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1985), aft'd,
802 F.2d 975 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1374 (1987). In Lippo, a franchise oil
company discovered one of its service station operators had been purchasing
gasoline from another supplier (at lower cost) and selling it under the franchise
mark and through its pumps and facilities. 776 F.2d at 708. The franchise
agreement provided for a ten-day cure period during which the station operator
ceased selling the misbranded gasoline. Id. at 709. The oil company filed suit to
terminate the station operator; however, the district court entered judgment in
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failure to maintain minimum sales requirements," 5 cleanliness
standards" t6 and product quality.' '7 On the other hand, courts
have implied covenants of good faith or voided termination
agreements on grounds of public policyl 8 or unconfavor of the franchisee. Id. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the franchisor could not terminate
under the agreement since the station operator cured within 10 days. Id. at 716.
In dissent, Judge Posner found the court's rationale flawed. He stated:
Since liability for breach of contract is strict and since the franchise
contract imposes many duties on the franchisee that he might violate
accidentally (for example, his worker might fail to clean the station's
restrooms one day), the provision allowing cure serves to prevent Mobil from using the pretext of an inadvertent, unimportant, and perhaps
even involuntary breach by Lippo to yank his franchise. Misbranding,
however, is never that kind of breach.
Id. at 722. Judge Posner continued his diatribe by chastising his brethren for
failing to view the contract terms from the parties' perspective. He said:
What we ought to ask, and use common sense and a sense of commercial reality in answering, is whether the parties would have agreed
to make the ten-day cure provision applicable to misbranding if the issue had come up during the contract negotiation. It seems to me pretty
obvious that Mobil would never have agreed to such an application and
that for Lippo to have pressed for it would just have convinced Mobil of
Lippo's unreliability and have made the negotiations collapse. Imagine
Lippo saying to Mobil: 'I would like to be able to sell another supplier's gas under your name for up to ten days after you catch me at it,
as that will enable me among other things to enjoy the use of your
premises at a much lower rent during that period.'
Id. at 725. In this case, Posner's "common sense" approach to materiality and
termination agreements highlights the inequity to franchisors, and indirectly to
compliant franchisees, who work diligently to maintain the franchise system's
reputation.
115. See Malone v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md.
1979).
116. See, e.g., Bonanza Int'l, Inc. v. Restaurant Management Consultants,
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1431 (E.D. La. 1986); Walters v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 476 F.
Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d
945 (failure to adhere to franchise quality, service and cleanliness standards)
aft'd, 125 Ill. App. 3d 972, 466 N.E.2d 958 (1984), aff'd, 138 Ill. App. 3d 367,
485 N.E.2d 1188 (1985); McDonald's Corp. v. Markin, Inc., 209 Neb. 49, 306
N.W.2d 158 (1981) (failure to adhere to company policies and vacillating ratings
regarding quality, service and cleanliness); cf Lippo, 776 F.2d at 706 (oil company could not terminate franchisee for misbranding gasoline because of tenday curative provision).
118. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). The court voided a termination agreement
based upon "grossly disproportionate bargaining power" and the "grossly unfair contractual provisions which clearly tend to the injury of the public in some
way." 63 N.J. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601. The court further stated that public
policy required that there be read into lease and dealer agreements the restriction that franchisors shall not have the right of unilateral termination unless
there is a showing that a franchisee has failed to substantially perform his obligations under the agreement. Id. at 409, 307 A.2d at 603.
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scionability. "19
Statutory schemes generally allow termination upon a
franchisor's showing of "good cause." 20 However, the definition
of what constitutes "good cause" varies from state to state.' 2 '
Also, some states impose additional economic burdens upon
franchisors who terminate franchisees. For example, some states
require a franchisor to repurchase a terminated franchisee's inventory even though termination is for "good cause."' 2 2 These
differing combinations of judicial decisions and legislative enactments limit a franchisor's ability to use termination clauses to ensure franchisee compliance with the franchise agreement.
Economic analysis suggests that the elimination of or further reductions in the use of termination agreements are ill-advised be23
cause of the agreements' potential for procompetitive uses.'
V.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF QUALITY CONTROL MECHANISMS

The primary reason for engaging in an economic analysis of
quality control mechanisms is that economic theory provides an
analytical framework for determining the most cost-efficient
124
means of achieving a social goal. Positive economic theory
presupposes autonomous individuals pursuing their own interests
subject only to limited budgets.' 2 5 Consequently, economic models, and economic methodology in general, are extraordinarily
helpful when setting social policy because they focus upon the
119. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433
(1976) (provision giving gasoline supplier right to cancel on ten-days notice if,
in supplier's judgment, dealer had impaired the quality, good name, goodwill or
reputation of products was unconscionable on its face).
120. See Fern & Klein, Restrictions on Termination and Nonrenewal of Franchises:
A Policy Analysis, 36 Bus. LAW. 1041, 1044 (1981).
121. Id. at 1044-50.
122. Id.; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20035 (West 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(c) (West 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(3) (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121 'A2, para. 1720 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); MicH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.1527(d) (West Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.045 (West Supp.
1987). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-209 (1987) (right to repurchase if terminated without good cause).
123. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
124. Positive economic theory focuses on determining the most efficient
method of achieving a particular social goal. The goal of positive economics is
not to determine a particular social goal, but to determine the cost-efficient
means of attaining one society has chosen. C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD,
MICROECONOMiC THEORY 3 (4th ed. 1975).
125. See id. at 29. In the commercial setting, this assumption translates into
profit maximization as a firm's goal. Id. at 2.
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fundamental social goal of maximizing the benefits to society
from scarce resources.
A.

Consumer Welfare

A fundamental goal of positive economic theory is the maximization of consumer welfare.' 26 In a competitive economy, the
independent utility-maximizing behavior of consumers and firms
eventually results in a social organization that maximizes social
welfare. This result is limited, of course, to those markets fitting
the structural prerequisites of a competitive market. Due to the
pervasiveness of the franchising form of business in the United
States, this paper will employ the classic microeconomic models
127
in its economic analysis.
This section will examine which of the alternative regulatory
systems, including no governmental intervention, minimizes the
costs of providing goods and services through a franchise system.
It will additionally explore which regulations, if any, will increase
social welfare beyond that attained in the absence of regulation. 128 At the outset it should be noted that economic theory
provides certain benchmarks to measure changes in welfare. The
basic measures of increased social welfare are the reduction of
input costs to producers and prices to consumers, 12 9 and the re126. See M. WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE INDUSTRY 5-10 (1984); see
also R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-87 (1981) (wealth maximization
as a normative goal).
127. A few assumptions are necessary before further developing an economic thesis. Unless otherwise noted, this paper is founded upon the assumptions of perfect competition, which are "(1) firm produce a homogeneous
commodity ...; (2) both firms and consumers are numerous ...; (3) both firms
and consumers possess perfect information" and pursue individual profit or utility maximizing behavior; and "(4) entry into and exit from the market is free for
firms and consumers in the long run." J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT,
MICROECONoMIC THEORY:

A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

136 (3d ed. 1980).

These conditions assure that there are no market imperfections created by monopoly power in either input or output markets. However, these assumptions
merely provide the default structure of the paper. For example, because most
franchises involve the use of trademarks, the first assumption may be invalid
because product differentiation is a hallmark of many franchise markets. Consequently, violations of these structural assumptions are noted where necessary.
However, this paper's economic analysis is limited to traditional theory, suggesting that values such as productive and allocative efficiency are those most
worthy in the paper's limited context.
128. The determination of which of various alternative states maximizes social welfare involves the concept of pareto efficiency. A pareto efficient allocation
is a utility maximizing distribution of resources resulting from perfect competition. M. WATERSON, supra note 126, at 5.
129. For example, a hypothetical franchise system providing X units of its
product per year at a cost of Y dollars has a clear improvement in social welfare
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lated concepts of producer and consumer surplus. 130 The sum of
if its costs fall to (Y-1). Similarly, ifa consumer purchases X units of a good at Y
dollars and the price falls to (Y-1) dollars, the consumer experiences increased
satisfaction. In a competitively structured economy, the reduction in production
costs would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Consequently, the reduction of production costs or consumer prices both increase social welfare. It is sufficient to note that social welfare is increased when a firm
experiences reduced production costs. Someone, whether stockholders, employees or management, will receive the benefit depending upon the particular
theory of allocation.
130. Consumer surplus is the excess benefits consumers receive from consuming a particular good above the amount they pay. Producer surplus is the
excess benefits producers receive from selling their product at a particular price.
See H. VARIAN, MICROECONoMIc ANALYSIS 207-15 (1978).

QI

Qo

Where S
= supply of good X
MC = marginal production costs
D
= Demand function for good X
Graphically, consumer surplus is the area AEP0 given price equals P0 . This
area represents the additional benefits consumers of good X receive for which
they do not have to pay. Producer surplus is the area BEP0 . This area represents the benefits producers receive from the sale of good X above marginal
production costs. This measure is also termed quasi-rents. The sum of producer and consumer surplus, area AEB, is the standard economic measure of
welfare. In a competitively structured industry, the supply function becomes
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producer and consumer surplus is the standard measure of economic welfare.1 3' The following sections analyze the economic
benefits, in terms of consumer and producer surplus, for various
significant control mechanisms. The analysis begins by discussing how the reduction of policing, agency and transactions costs
increases social welfare. The analysis than considers the economic benefits of particular quality control mechanisms. A summary follows urging policy makers to consider the economic
effects of precluding efficiency-enhancing mechanisms.
B.

Reduction of Policing, Agency and Transactions Costs

One rationale underlying the use of various quality assurance
mechanisms is that they will increase social welfare by reducing
policing, agency and transactions costs.' 3 2 The franchisor's goal
is to maximize its own profits by decreasing expenditures and increasing revenues. Because a franchisor generally extracts its revenues from its franchisees in the form of royalties on sales, its
goal is to maximize sales by franchisees subject to a particular
level of franchisor costs. Additionally, the franchisor desires to
reduce the expenditures necessary to police product quality and
eliminate costs of recontracting, while ensuring franchisee compliance with contractual provisions.
Absent legal constraints on the use of quality control mechanisms, it is reasonable to expect franchisors to pursue their own
pecuniary interests by selecting the most cost-efficient method of
ensuring product uniformity. Precluding certain methods of
quality control or making others more costly increases the ultimate cost of providing franchised products and services, while reperfectly elastic, meaning an infinitely large supply is available at the market
price. By definition, producer surplus is zero in such a market' For example,
with a market price line (supply function) of POE, there exists no producers' surplus. Each supplier earns only a normal return. Consumers, however, still receive surplus equal to AEP. So, in competitive supply markets, the standard
welfare measure simply becomes the level of consumer surplus.
131. Id. at 214-15. The authors introduce the concept of a "deadweight
loss" which occurs when price and output deviate from that attainable in a free
market equilibrium. For example, if price is above and output below equilibrium, some consumers no longer consume the good in question. This loss in
welfare of consumers who would have consumed the good, but no longer do
because of the price increase, is a deadweight loss. In the graph supra note 130,
the deadweight loss resulting from a price increase from Po to P, is the triangular
area EFG. The area EFH is the loss in consumer surplus while the area EGH is
the loss in producer surplus. The area PIFHPO is a wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
132. For a definition of policing, agency and transaction costs, see supra
note 17.
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ductions in these costs directly increase the profits to the
franchisor. Avoiding the evident normative question,1 3 3 these
franchisor profits increase overall social welfare because they are
resources the franchisor would otherwise have used for the unproductive purpose of cost-inefficient monitoring.
Stringent quality control mechanisms which reduce the level
of franchisor policing costs may also increase franchisee expenditures on quality maintenance. At first glance, these expenditures
seem to counterbalance franchisor savings. However, the franchisees merely are fulfilling their duty to provide a particular level
of contractually specified quality. Absent some incentive to overinvest in quality,' 3 4 the franchisees' expenses are not socially
wasteful because they produce a quality standard representative
of the franchise system. Without such expenditures on product
35
and service quality, the franchise itself would suffer.'
An additional rationale for relaxing legal constraints on
product quality control mechanisms is the minimization of contract enforcement costs. Undoubtedly, the costs of enforcing
contractual terms through a third party are prohibitive. Both litigation and alternative methods of dispute resolution are costly
and time-consuming means of enforcing agreements and assessing damages. Oftentimes contracting parties employ self-enforc36
ing mechanisms in order to avoid such delays and expenses.'
This is particularly true with long-term relationships where
neither party expects the other to be liable.' 3 7 If a breach occurs,
the terminating party forfeits some asset pledged in case of termination. There is no need to utilize either a third party or ambiguous standards such as "willful" or "good cause."' 3 8 As with
133. The normative question is whether franchisor wealth should be socially beneficial. Absent a concurrent reduction in any other group's wealth,
there is an increase in social welfare.
134. Risk averse franchisees may overinvest in quality to reduce the risk of
breaching contractual standards. In essence, the franchisee pays a premium to
insure against the risks of breach and potential termination. See R. Bt.AIR & L.
KENNY, supra note 22, at 161-66. This premium may not be socially wasteful
because the franchisee's consumers receive supercompetitive quality.
135. The expenditures are necessary to maintain a particular standard of
quality consumers expect. These expenditures may raise franchisees' costs. The
costs, however, are used to maintain goodwill and to differentiate the franchise
from other competitors. As such, the expenditures contribute to competition in
the marketplace. See, e.g., Stigler, Price and Non-price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON.
149 (1968).
136. See Telser, supra note 63, at 28.
137. Id. at 29-30.
138. Id. at 27-28.
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bonding agreements, self-enforcing agreements assume that the
parties will not terminate unless it is in their economic interest to
do so.'1

9

Finally, the product quality assurance mechanisms selected
should take into account the characteristics of the franchised
good or service. For example, a franchisor of shoes faces a different quality control problem than a fast food franchisor. Consumers can directly inspect shoes before purchase to determine
product quality. Fast food, however, must be consumed before a
consumer can judge its quality. Consequently, a taxonomy of
goods and services results. Goods whose qualities can be determined prepurchase, such as shoes, are termed "search goods,"
while goods whose qualities are determined postpurchase, such
as fast-food, are termed "experience goods." 40 A third category,
"credence goods," are those goods whose qualities cannot be
evaluated through normal use; rather, their qualities are discernable only after a long period of time has elapsed. 14 1 An example
of a credence good is medical services.
The importance of distinguishing among experience, search
and credence goods is twofold. First, a franchisor may use various quality assurance mechanisms according to the inherent characteristics of the franchised good or service. Maintaining a
consistent level of product quality may be of greater concern to
high-price search good franchises than to low-price experience
good franchises. For example, consumers are generally willing to
sample a meal from McDonald's more frequently than an automobile from Ford. 14 2 Second, the economic justifications for different quality control mechanisms vary among search, experience
and credence goods. A search good such as shoes may require
less franchisor monitoring than an experience good such as fast
139. For example, "[a] party to a self-enforcing agreement calculates
whether his gain from violating the agreement is greater or less than the loss of
future net benefits that he would incur as a result of detection of his violation
and the consequent termination of the agreement by the other party." Id. at 28.
140. Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78J. POL. ECON. 311, 311-13
(1970).
141. Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16J. L.

& ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973).
142. The lower the price of an experience good, the greater the likelihood
consumers are willing to test such goods multiple times before formulating a
conclusion as to product quality. However, consumers will invest a greater level
of time and inspection before purchasing high-priced search goods. The
amount of information consumers demand prior to making a purchase of either
a search or experience good relates directly to the price of the good. Nelson,
Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 737-38 (1974).
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food. As a result, the type of goods influences the amount and
cost of product quality policing.
C.

Economic Analysis of Bonding Agreements

In the law, penalty and unilateral termination clauses have
opprobrious and repugnant connotations; in economics, however, their existence finds justification. 143 In fact, the economic
vindication of bonding agreements transcends the franchise relationship, finding applications in noncommercial areas. 44 Because a rational economic agent is presumed to avoid costs, the
primary way of deterring conduct is to impose penalties of appropriate magnitude. This imposition of penalties or forfeitures is
the foundation of economic behavior modification.
1. Penalty Clauses
Franchisees who provide substandard products breach the
franchise agreement and damage the entire franchise system by
diminishing the franchise's goodwill.' 4 5 If the franchisor merely
collects damages, as measured by the amount of costs the franchisee avoided, the franchisee has very little incentive to be honest. For a given probability of detection and the absence of a
penalty clause, a franchisee will almost always cheat and reimburse the franchisor for lost sales and avoided costs. 14 6 In this
situation, the franchisor must continually monitor franchisees to
prevent their diminishing the level of product quality. The costs
of monitoring could be substantial and enforcement would neces14 7
sarily be imperfect.
143. But see Clarkson, Miller & Muris, LiquidatedDamages v. Penalties: Sense or
Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351 (arguing policy of not enforcing penalty clauses
may be efficient).
144. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) (characterizing criminal sanctions in economic terms). Much
of the literature on channeling agents' behavior relies upon the model of deterrence originally applied in the criminal law context. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 73-84 (1983) (discussion of optimal deterrence models for risk-neutral and risk-averse individuals).
145. For a discussion of the free-rider problem, see supra notes 32-36 and
accompanying text.
146. See Klein & Saft, supra note 32, at 352. Suppose the probability of detection is 10% each year. If the franchisee continually cheats, it will find it profitable to do so in nine out of every ten years. In one year, the franchisee will
have to disgorge profits; but overall, the franchisee has not been deterred and
will continue to cheat. Of course, this analysis assumes a probability of detection less than one and may, therefore, be unrealistic.
147. Imperfect enforcement exists when the costs of detection and enforcement result in breachers being penalized with a probability of less than one. See
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One way of reducing these policing costs is for the franchisor
to institute supercompensatory damages 148 or penalty clauses. If
the shirking franchisee must compensate the entire franchise system for damages due to a reduced level of sales and goodwill,
there is a greater likelihood of deterrence. 14 9 In this case, the
level of damages, though seemingly punitive, is actually compensatory. 150 It appears punitive because it exceeds the level of selfenrichment the franchisee receives.' 5 ' Because the franchisee
takes account of only its own costs and benefits, its expected benefits or cheating may be less than the damage to the franchise
system overall.' 5 2 In contrast, true penalty clauses would require
Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1455-63 (1980).
148. Plaintiffs are often undercompensated in contract actions because of
the uncompensated costs of transactions costs and imperfect information. Consequently, some types of contracts are underenforced, resulting in excessive
levels of breach and resort to self-help remedies. See id. at 1444-45. Supercompensatory damages, which are damages in excess of directly compensatory damages, can improve economic efficiency in these situations.
149. See id. at 1462-64. Increasing damages removes two sources of inefficiency: (1) cheating by franchisees; and (2) detection costs by franchisors. Id. at
1462.
150. Analytically, the measure of damages attributable to a franchisee's
breach of product quality standards includes total lost sales (present and future)
due to reduced levels of consumer demand and goodwill. See Klein & Saft, supra
note 32, at 352 n.23. The authors state that a franchisee will continue cheating
on the franchise unless a penalty clause is included in the contract. They describe such a clause as
[a] penalty term in the sense that, when detected, the franchisee would
pay more to the franchisor than the cost saving resulting from the supply of lower quality in the individual transaction. It need not be a penalty in the sense of a payment greater than the estimated cost of lower
quality on all transactions likely to have been made prior to detection
plus the capital depreciation of the franchisor's brand name.
Id.
151. An analogy to the franchise context is the contractual relationship between cooperative marketing associations and their members. 5 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 85, § 783. Williston quotes at length an opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
"These contracts made between the association and its members, provide that the member shall market a given crop exclusively with the
association and stipulate an amount as liquidated damages in case the
member sells elsewhere. . . . 'If any member breaks his contract by not
bringing his produce into the pool controlled by the selling agent...
he may cause damage to the association and its members which, while
very .substantial, will be difficult to value precisely' ".
Id. § 783 at 723-24 (quoting United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., 186 F.2d 460, 462
(3d Cir. 1950), (quoting English Hop Growers, Ltd. v. Dering, [1928] 2 K.B.
174, 182 cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951)).
152. See C. GOETZ, LAw & EcONoMicS 314-15 (1984). Generally, individuals take into account only those costs and benefits they must bear directly. However, individual actions often impose costs on others. If the individual does not
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payments in excess of the damages to the franchise system attributable to the franchisee's action. Theoretically, such penalty
clauses would provide a level of deterrence not available through
ordinary liquidated damages provisions.' 5 3 Because the
franchisor's goal is to prevent franchisee cheating, penalty clauses
would provide a low-cost means of deterrence.
For example, if the costs of avoiding detection outweigh
compliance with quality standards, 54 the franchisee will be forced
to make a cost/benefit decision. A particular franchisee must decide what minimal level of product quality is sufficient to satisfy its
consumers' expectations and the franchisor's standards in case of
inspection. The franchisee has an independent self-interest in
maintaining product quality especially when the franchisee's location results in a high level of repeat business. 5 5 Additionally, the
franchisee has an interest in avoiding franchisor sanctions for
product quality breaches. In some instances, the former interest
may result in a product quality level sufficient to satisfy the latter.
However, absent this situation, the franchisee's strategy is dependent upon these factors: (1) the probability of inspection; (2) the
probability of detection; and (3) the severity of sanctions for detected violations. In short, the expected benefits of breach must
exceed the expected costs of a violation to the franchisee for a
substandard level of product quality.
A franchisor could ensure a particular level of product qualtake account of these external costs, inefficiency results. So, shirking franchisees
not having to consider the external costs of reduced goodwill on the franchise
system, are undeterred in their underproduction of quality. In such a case, the
franchisor and other franchisees suffer harm. Requiring shirking franchisees to
compensate for these losses forces the franchisee to consider the external effects
of its actions.
153. See Farber, supra note 147, at 1476. Absent a termination clause, a
franchisee's incentive to totally comply with the terms of a product quality
agreement is minimal. Suppose the likelihood of a franchisor detecting a breach
in a given year is 10% and damages are equal to the level of franchisee profits
(or costs avoided) of, say, $1000. The expected value of continually cheating is
$900 because for every time the franchisee is detected cheating and forced to
disgorge profits, on average the franchisee will avoid detection nine times out of
ten. Without a punitive element to the damages, franchisees will always find it in
their best interest to cheat.
154. This assumption will not hold for certain types of franchise agreements. If the cost of complying with quality standards is exceedingly high, franchisees will continue to provide substandard products but attempt to avoid
detection.
155. For example, a fast food franchise located near an interstate highway
exit is less likely to rely on repeat business compared to a location adjoining a
business center. The location with a high level of repeat sales has a greater
interest in maintaining product quality standards.
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ity without an elaborate monitoring system by instituting a system
of fines set at appropriate levels. The greater the magnitude of
the sanctions, the greater the franchisees' incentive to comply
with the standards.' 5 6 Franchisors would not need to expend as
much on policing costs because the greater the fine to the franchisee for noncompliance, the greater the expected cost of non57
compliance, assuming a particular probability of detection.
Consequently, franchisors could allow the probability of detection to fall and still expect, on average, a particular quality level
among franchisees' products. As the franchisor decreases the
level of monitoring, there is a decline in the probability of detection; in this manner, the franchisor reduces monitoring expenditures while maintaining the same disincentive against franchisee
cheating. 158

A number of other rationales have developed for the use of
penalty clauses. First, penalty clauses have an informational aspect. A party who voluntarily accepts a penalty clause provision
may be signalling his willingness to establish a reputation for performance. 15 9 Second, penalty clauses may be methods of allocat156. This result is evident in the franchisee's expected cost function. The
cost of noncompliance is:
E (cost) = E (probability of detection and punishment) * (fine)
So, for example, a risk-neutral franchisee will have expected costs of $1000 if the
probability of detection is one percent and the fine is $100,000. If the expected
benefits of cheating are greater than $1000, the franchisee will find it profitable
to cheat.
157. The mathematical relationship is:
Net expected benefits = E (marginal revenue Q.) - E (costs)
=

(marginal revenue

Q)

-

E (P * fine)

Where Q, = quality level set by franchisee
P = probability of detection and punishment
fine = cheating fine set by franchisor
Consequently, as the amount of the fine increases, the expected costs increase,
causing a decline in the net expected benefits from cheating. However, holding
net expected benefits constant, the probability of detection must fall. So, the
franchisor need only increase the level of fine to reduce the level of detection
costs necessary to maintain the current level of "cheating."
158. The relationship between monitoring expenditures and probability of
detection is positively correlated and probably nonlinear. As franchisor expenditures on monitoring increase, the probability of detection should increase.
Conversely, a decrease in expenditures should result in a decreased probability
of detection. However, there are decreasing returns to monitoring expenditures; as expenditures increase, the probability of detection increases but at a
decreasing rate.
159. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 224
(1979); see also Rea, Efficiency Implications of Penaltiesand Liquidated Damages, 13 J.L.
STUD. 147, 156-58 (1984).
Although no one ever knows for sure that he will honor a contract,
those who know that they are more likely to honor than others will find
it less costly to agree to penalty clauses. If buyers cannot differentiate
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ing risks in case of a breach. If expected damages are uncertain
or difficult to establish, or if one party is more risk-averse than the
other, the parties may desire to specify such damages.' 60 These
contractually stipulated damages may exceed the actual pecuniary
measure of damages upon a subsequent breach.' 6' Third, punitive damages provide a means of minimizing the impact of imperfect enforcement. When the probability of detection and
enforcement is less than one, parties not operating under penalty
clause will always find it in their interest to breach. Penalty
clauses allow a franchisor to minimize monitoring costs in these
instances. 6 2 Arguably the optimal measure of punitive damages
should be infinite to cause the probability of breach to approach
zero. 16 3 However, because most individuals are risk-averse, the
level of damages need not be "draconian" to force the probability
164
of breach close to zero.
Penalty clauses may be inappropriate when either party has
the power to affect the probability of a breach. If a party to a
contract can benefit by influencing the probability of breach, a
low risk from high risk sellers, a seller's acceptance of a penalty clause
is a signal of a low probability of breach.
Id. at 156. The author provides the example of a company placing a security
deposit in a bank offering purchasers of an influenza medicine a cash payment if
the medicine failed to work. Id. at 156 n.37 (citing Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball
Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A.)).
160. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 97, at 557-58.
161. Id. The authors contend that because of courts' unwillingness to compensate nonpecuniary losses such as risk allocation, courts have undercompensated victims of breach. Consequently, contracting parties have sought other
means of risk allocation. Id. at 555. But cf Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of
Contract, 11 J.L. STUD. 35 (1982) (nonpecuniary losses not fully compensable in
an efficient contract).
162. See Farber, supra note 147. The author demonstrates that increasing
the level of damages reduces detection and agency costs. Id. at 1462.
163. Id. The author states:
Efficiency thus can always be increased by increasing damages; complete efficiency would apparently require infinitely high punitive
damages.
This result may seem puzzling. One might expect that with sufficiently high damages, [franchisees] would be completely deterred from
breach. While the deterrent effect of damages obviously does increase
with higher damages, the incentive for [franchisors] to engage in detection decreases as the level of breach decreases. The decreased level of
detection undermines the deterrent effect of increased damages by decreasing the probability of being caught. As a result, the level of breach
declines as damages increase, but never reaches zero.
Id. at 1463.
164. Id. at 1463 n.67. At some level the amount of damages will be sufficiently high, given the franchisee's wealth, forcing the franchisee into strict compliance with the franchise contract.
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moral hazard problem exists. 165 For example, a franchisor who
ensures quality through a penalty clause has a reduced incentive
to invest energies in assisting franchisees with quality control.
Conversely, high punitive damages increase the franchisor's incentive to discover a franchisee's breach and profit from the penalty provision. 166 This incentive is tempered by the franchisor's
interest in maintaining long-term relations with existing and po67
tential franchisees.'
In the legal literature, there is no general consensus regarding the proper distinction between liquidated damages and penalty clauses. There is actually a continuum of damage measures
that includes compensatory, liquidated, supercompensatory and
punitive damages. The economic analysis suggests that each of
these measures may be beneficial in different situations. In particular, both supercompensatory and punitive damages tend to increase efficiency by reducing policing, agency and transactions
costs. Consequently, policymakers should consider the efficiencyenhancing attributes of these clauses despite their legally malefi8
cent status. 16
2.

Firm-specific Capital Assets and Initial FranchisePayments

A second way franchisors can use bonding agreements to influence franchisee behavior is to include termination clauses in
franchise contracts. Upon a franchisee's material breach of the
agreement, 69 the franchisor is authorized to terminate the rela165. See Rea, supra note 159, at 155.
166. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 143, at 369-70. The authors
assert that if a promisee has more to gain from the promisor's breach, the promisee will expend resources on inducing a breach; in like manner, the promisor
will counter the promisee's efforts with socially wasteful investments of resources. Id. But see A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 159, at 225. The authors state:
If the penalty clause survives the negotiating process, that is presumably because the benefits to the promisee exceed the costs to the promisor. However costly a contract containing a penalty clause may be, all
of the relevant costs are fully borne by the contracting parties and
therefore all will be taken into account in the negotiation. Only if it is
believed that the parties will fail to assess these costs correctly is there a
basis for intervention; the basis, however, is paternalism rather than
efficiency.
Id.
167. See generally Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26
J.L. & ECON. 691 (1983) (reputation substitutes, at least partially, for legal rules).
168. For a discussion of the economic benefits of these clauses, see supra
notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
169. Concern for the materiality of the breach has caused some legislators
to institute "good cause" requirements in some states. This type of legislation is
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tionship. 170 Termination often leaves the franchisee with specialized inventories and franchise-specific capital assets.' 7 ' These
assets may have little or no value outside of their use in the particular franchise. Consequently, termination could impose a substantial financial burden on the franchisee. This burden is
reduced to the extent the assets have resale value. However, to
the extent the assets have reduced value outside the franchise relationship, they can serve as sources of franchisor control over
72
franchisee performance in a bonding agreement.1
Most franchise agreements require franchisees to pay large
initial lump-sum fees in order to acquire a franchise. These payments are generally not recoverable unless the franchisor procures them in a fraudulent or illegal manner. The franchisee
expects to recoup its franchise investment from profits earned
from its operations. 7 3 Therefore, the franchisee has the incentive to maintain an adequate level of product quality to ensure an
designed to prevent the malevolent franchisor from terminating franchisees
without providing proper notice and reasons. Some states limit termination to
particular situations and impose post termination conditions upon franchisors.
For a discussion of the legal approach to termination clauses, see supra notes
112-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Judge Posner's "common
sense" approach to materiality, see supra note 114.
170. A terminable-at-will clause allows a franchisor to "more effectively
eliminate cheating because the costs of proving cheating to an external observer,
such as a court, would be avoided and the franchisee would know that detection
results in swift termination." Muris, supra note 45, at 575.
171. See Williamson, supra note 6, at 521-23. "Costs that are highly specific
to a transaction have two attributes: they are incurred in advance of the contemplated exchange; and their value in alternative uses, or by alternative users, is
greatly reduced." Id. at 522. Common examples of such costs are physical plant
or fixed accounting costs; however, investments in labor can produce transaction specific human capital. Id.
172. See, e.g., In re Tastee-Freeze Int'l, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1195 (1973). This
case involved a franchisor requiring franchisees to purchase soft ice cream
equipment; however, the equipment required a patented feeder mechanism the
franchisor rented for one dollar per month. Without the mechanism, the franchisees' equipment had little market value and the value of the franchisees' investment would be lost upon termination. Thus, the investment in the
equipment served the franchisor's goal of assuring product quality (or franchisee compliance in general) by acting as security against a franchisee breach.
However, if the franchisor had rented the equipment and mechanism together, it
would lose financial leverage because it could not impose a capital loss on the
franchisee upon termination. A similar result follows if the mechanism were
sold to franchisees; in this case, the franchisee could sell the equipment and
mechanism upon termination without a capital loss. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2, at 306 n.22.
173. These future expected profits are termed "quasi-rents." Quasi-rents
are returns to short-run fixed inputs measured as the difference between shortrun total revenue and short-run total variable costs. See C. FERGUSON & J.
GOULD, supra note 124, at 381-83.
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adequate financial return. In addition, the possibility of termination and imposition of a capital loss for breaching the franchise
agreement weighs heavily upon the franchisee's choice of product
quality levels. The combination of these effects influences the
franchisee to comply with the franchise's product quality
standards.
D. Economic Analysis of Tying
The economic analysis of tying has been extensive. In most
instances, economic commentators fail to discover any of the evil
anticompetitive effects attributed to tying arrangements. The primary concern with tying is the alleged potential for a monopolist
to expand its power into the tied product market. However, this
leverage theory has been largely discredited. 74 Economic theory
demonstrates that monopoly power in one market generally can
not be extended into another. 7 5 Tying has also been criticized as
a method of price discrimination. 1 76 Again, economic theory has
rebutted the reputed anticompetitive effects such a theory alleges.' 77 In fact, tying has a number of procompetitive justifications. For example, when the tied and tying goods are
technologically interdependent, the tying good may not perform
satisfactorily without the specific tied good. Thus, the franchisor
may wish to protect its goodwill by instituting a tie.' 78 Another
justification is the exploitation of economies ofjoint sales. If the
concurrent sale or production of two goods is more cost-efficient
than the separate sale or provision of the same goods, a seller can
lower its costs through a tie. 179 Tie-ins can also mitigate the in174. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 365-81 (1978). "The law's theory of tying arrangements is merely another example of the discredited transferof-power theory, and perhaps no other variety of that theory has been so thoroughly and repeatedly demolished in the legal and economic literature." Id. at
372.
175. See generally R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 81, at 403-04 (economic analysis of judicial concerns with market foreclosure and denial of consumers' freedom of choice); see also Blair & Finci, supra note 80, at 545.
176. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 70. However, tying is more properly defined as a metering method rather than a form of price discrimination. See Hansen & Roberts, Metered Tying Arrangements, Allocative Efficiency, and Price
Discrimination, 47 S. ECON.J. 73 (1980).
177. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173-84
(1976) (condemns tying only if used as systematic form of price discrimination).
178. See Blair & Finci, supra note 80, at 545; see, e.g., United States v.Jerrold
Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (compulsory service contract comprises reasonable method of assuring long-term success of new business with
highly uncertain future), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
179. See Blair & Finci, supra note 80, at 549-50.
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fluence of risk and uncertainty,18 0 or be means of promotional
18 1
selling.
Most commentators believe that tying offers an efficient and
effective solution to the free rider problem. 8 2 They argue that
contractual minimum product quality standards are ineffective for
two reasons. First, most franchisees often find it to be in their
financial interest to breach the contract by cheating. 183 Second,
because penalty clauses are generally illegal, franchisors must rely
on termination clauses to penalize such breaches. But in order
for termination to be effective, franchisors must devise methods
of ensuring that franchisees invest in specific nonsalvageable assets. 18 4 Consequently, so long as tying remains illegal,
franchisors are forced to substitute more cumbersome and inefficient quality assurance mechanisms. The franchisor has the
choice of incurring greater policing costs or allowing product
quality to erode-in either case, social welfare declines.
Balanced against the procompetitive arguments for tying are
those urging that tying is a coercive and exclusionary practice.
However, in light of the protracted and exceedingly vigorous debate over the past two decades, it seems apparent that tying has a
generally neutral and oftentimes positive effect on social welfare.
85
As such, legal standards should give way to economic realities. 1
E.

Wealth Redistribution and Relational Contracts

Tying, penalty clauses and termination provisions also create
the potential for redistribution of wealth between franchisor and
franchisee. Tying arrangements, for example, allow franchisors
to collect revenues from franchisees by requiring the purchase of
a particular bundle of items. The franchisor may set the price of
the tied bundle at a level that approximates a percentage royalty.
While revenue generating methods such as royalties on sales and
franchise fees pose no outcry, the tying extractions evoke feelings
of "unfairness." The economic result of all these methods is the
franchisee's compensation to the franchisor for the benefits of be180. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
181. See Blair & Finci, supra note 80, at 551-52.
182. See, e.g.,
Klein & Saft, supra note 32, at 351.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 352.
185. "That the law's course remained utterly undeflected for so long casts
an illuminating and, if you are of a sardonic turn of mind, amusing sidelight
upon the relation of scholarship to judicial lawmaking." R. BORK, supra note
174, at 372.
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ing a part of the system. If the tie-in, or other quality control
mechanism, is contained in the original franchise agreement,
there seemingly can be no objection, absent fraud or duress, to
the resulting exchange between franchisor and franchisee. This
transfer of wealth between contractually bound parties is simply a
bargain fulfilled.
Alternatively, franchisors may invoke postcontractual tie-ins
under broadly phrased franchise clauses to alter or tighten product quality standards. Franchisors may utilize such clauses to engage in opportunistic behavior that results from the nature of the
relational contract between the parties.18 6 This opportunistic behavior, though outwardly reproachful, is consistent with the
franchisor's primary economic interest: maximizing the profits
that result from the competitive success of the franchise system.
Consequently, and because franchisors are not in the business of
bankrupting franchisees, these types of revenue extractions have
limitations. The franchisor's main interests are maintaining profitable franchises and an eager queue of potential franchisees. A
franchisor's shortsighted and avaricious extractions of additional
87
wealth may frustrate both these goals.'
From an economic perspective, the transfer of wealth from
franchisee to franchisor has an indeterminate effect on social welfare absent some standard of comparing interpersonal satisfaction.' 8 8 In fact, erroneous conclusions can result from examining
186. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 2. The authors explore the
incentive for vertical integration based upon the possibility of postcontractual
opportunistic behavior which occurs when specialized quasi-rents are appropriable from one party's specific capital investment. Id. at 297-98.
187. The court in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1970), provided a particularly insightful analysis of the franchisor-franchisee relationship:
We do not imagine that many persons are, in any meaningful sense
[W]e would expect to
forced to enter into franchise agreements ....
find that an arrangement apparently reasonable at its inception begins
to seem burdensome to the franchisee as the business is successfully
established. Only from the successful business can the franchisor effectively seek a continuing return on investment; yet as the venture prospers, the franchisee, in time, may come to regard the arrangement as
onerous, restricting his profitability.
Id. at 1223.
188. See, e.g., A. ATKINSON &J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS
351-52 (1980). One method of public policy analysis establishes a procedure for
determining the benefits and costs to different groups and then assigning a
"weight" to each group. Under this type of analysis, if the franchisor's and franchisees' welfare are given equal weight, the transfer of one dollar between them
renders social utility unchanged. This Bergson-Samuelson social utility function
requires some determination of the ethical beliefs underlying the proper
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the transfer in isolation from the parties' previous interactions.
This type of revenue extraction may have been an expectation the
parties had at the time they entered the franchise agreement.
Perhaps a highly successful franchisee could expect the franchisor
to impose, within the legal limits of the agreement, additional revenue-generating provisions. Because franchise contracts are frequently incomplete regarding future recontracting terms, 1 8 9
franchisor discrimination between successful and less successful
franchisees can be expected as a means of extracting additional
profits from profitable franchisees.
F.

Summary

An economic analysis of tying, termination agreements and
penalty clauses reveals the discrepancies in the legal justifications
for allowing certain quality control arrangements and not others.
For example, some courts uphold termination agreements based
upon violations of contract terms despite the franchisee's financial loss resulting from forfeiture of assets and future expected
profits. Given the same factual basis for termination, no court
would uphold a penalty clause sanctioning the violation in question. Even though the magnitude of the penalty may be less than
the economic consequences of termination, courts are reluctant
to enforce such penalties t1 0 Consequently, the form of the contractual provision weighs heavily when a franchisor seeks termination of a franchisee. This legal anomaly' 9 ' weakens the franchise
form of business because it forces the franchisor to utilize the
harshest form of control (i.e., termination) instead of an intermediate method (i.e., supercompensatory damages or penalty
clauses). Because the economic impacts of both termination
clauses and penalty clauses are very similar, a more unified and
weights; unfortunately, there is little assistance in the economic literature. See D.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE

181 (1979).

189. For a brief discussion of sequential contingent contracts, see supra
note 41.
190. For example, suppose a franchisee upon termination forfeits $100,000
in future expected profits. If the franchise agreement had specified a $100,000
penalty for the same breach, it is highly unlikely any court would uphold such a
"draconian" provision. In either instance the franchisee loses $100,000. However, under the penalty provision the franchisee may continue operating (absent
some contrary contractual provision) while the terminated franchisee must forfeit his investment and find another business opportunity.
191. "The common law, at the same time that it was forbidding penalty
clauses, allowed sellers to keep deposits and installment payments even if the
result was to give the seller more money than any reasonable estimate of his
damages." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (3d ed. 1986).
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consistent approach would permit the use of such intermediate
9 2
methods.1
The economic effects of foreclosing particular methods of
product quality assurance are conceptually straightforward. The
judicial or legislative elimination of one method causes the
franchisor to search for the next best alternative. Presumably, the
franchisor must substitute a more costly system of product quality
maintenance. Someone bears these additional costs. In the short
term, it may be the franchisor, locked into a particular contractual
arrangement with its franchisees and under a legal duty to maintain quality standards, 9 3 who experiences reduced profits. However, following the substitution of a system of control, a new
equilibrium would occur. It is a matter of conjecture, but it seems
probable that the gross profits which the franchise system can
now conceivably generate are reduced by the additional amount
the franchise system must expend on product quality assurance.' 94 The division of this lost profits would be a matter of bargaining between franchisor and franchisee. In the aggregate,
however, there is a net social welfare loss equal to the additional
resources expended on a relatively more inefficient product quality assurance system. With the goal of increasing competition,
192. One argument for allowing such intermediate methods is to avoid the
use of one uniformly severe penalty (i.e., termination). If the only sanction a
franchisor can impose on a breaching franchisee is termination, the franchisee
has an incentive to breach not just the marginally important contract terms, but
any and all others. See, e.g., id. at 208. This "all-or-nothing" approach to deterrence eliminates the relative distinctions between various types of breaches. In
fact, the lack of an intermediate sanction probably contributes to the incidence
of franchisee breach of quality and cleanliness standards without fear of termination. Oftentimes, these types of "nonmaterial" breaches fall outside the "good
cause" category, resulting in judicial reluctance to enforce termination clauses.
193. One source of this legal duty is the trademark laws. Franchisors who
license their products are under an affirmative duty to assure that franchisees
(licensees) continue to maintain product quality. A franchisor who permits a
substandard product to be represented under its trademark may be using its
mark in a deceptive manner. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1125 (1982); see also Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
194. This additional expenditure on product quality assurance may cause
an increase in the marginal or fixed costs of production. If the marginal production costs increase, both the franchisor and franchisee experience reduced profits, assuming a model of monopolistic competition. This results from the
upward shift of the supply curve causing price to increase and total revenues to
fall. See, e.g., C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, supra note 124, at 293-95. If the increased costs take the form of a lump-sum expenditure, the franchisor's shortrun profits fall; the franchisor may attempt to allocate these costs to franchisees
through increased royalty rates or tied input costs. The long-run analysis in this
case would be similar to an increase in marginal costs: price increases and industry output decreases. Id. at 300-01.
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limitations on quality control mechanisms appear to protect nobody. In summary, this economic argument suggests that consumer welfare may actually be reduced through limitations on the
use of penalty clauses, tying arrangements and termination agreements for quality control purposes.
VI.

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

The franchisor's goal of assuring product quality is furthered
by penalty clauses, tying arrangements and termination agreements. Each of these mechanisms can provide efficient means of
ensuring that franchisees maintain a particular level of product
quality. However, economic theory is at odds with current legal
standards governing the use of these methods. This paper has
analyzed various quality control mechanisms which courts and
legislators should more closely scrutinize before rejecting them as
harmful to consumer welfare. In particular, penalty clauses serve
legitimate purposes in many areas of commercial law by reducing
policing and agency costs. Yet courts find their use repugnant to
public policy. Tying arrangements serve analogous purposes. Judicial hostility, though historically severe, has currently waned, indicating courts' willingness to reanalyze the per se treatment of
tying. Finally, judicial and legislative animosity towards franchise
termination clauses appears to be misdirected. Termination
clauses serve useful purposes and are based on principles of private ordering and freedom of contract. Absent franchisors'
fraudulent or blatantly anticompetitive uses of such clauses,
courts and legislatures should carefully consider whether maintaining or expanding the use of franchisee protectionism favors
consumers or franchisees.
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